Cheddi Jagan returned from studies in the United States to a British Guiana in 1943 that was a cauldron of poverty. The report of the Moyne Commission, which investigated poverty in the region in the 1930s concluded that “for the laboring population, mere subsistence was increasingly problematic.” The report was so explosive that it was not published until 1945. It weighed heavily in subsequent developments. In 1946 Cheddi Jagan, Janet Jagan, Jocelyn Hubbard and Ashton Chase, the latter two of whom were active trade unionists, formed the Political Affairs Committee (PAC). In 1947 Cheddi Jagan fought and won a seat in the Legislative Council.
The cauldron of poverty was being stirred by decades of intensified industrial unrest, prompted by the new found strength of organised labour. The British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) was the first to be registered in the British Empire in 1922. The Man Power Citizens Association (MPCA) was registered in 1937 and represented sugar workers. The Transport Workers Union (TWU) was established in 1938 and superseded the BGLU as the largest and most militant in the city. In 1947 bauxite workers went on strike. In 1948 the successful Teare Strike led by the TWU, stopped the trains and boats and closed down the country for two weeks – unprecedented in a colony. In 1949 the Enmore strike of sugar workers took place during which five sugar workers, who became known as the Enmore Martyrs, were shot and killed. This heightened labour activity was also a feature in the Caribbean region and was prompted by a decline in sugar prices on the world market which further exacerbated poverty.
The basis of Guyana’s political outcomes has remained static for many decades. With deeply entrenched ethnic voting patterns, Indian Guyanese, originally constituting close to 50 percent of the population, would always have the upper hand. The two elections in 1957 and 1961 demonstrated to the African Guyanese political leadership that if it wanted political power, it would have to obtain it in coalition and later sustain it through electoral malpractice. And so, after the 1964 elections, in which the PPP obtained the plurality, the PNC and UF, together holding a majority of the seats in the parliament, formed a coalition government. The coalition ended in 1968 and the PNC resorted to electoral malpractice thereafter to maintain political power.
In 1957 the PNC merged with the United Democratic Party (UDP). The UDP, led by John Carter, a prominent lawyer of Mixed heritage, represented the interests of the Mixed and African middle and professional classes. At some point between 1973 and 1985 the support of these groups for the PNC started to wane. But it mostly returned with the election of Desmond Hoyte as President. These groups showed their electoral clout in 2006 when a section of it abandoned the PNC and supported the AFC. Many of these votes went back to the PNC after the election of David Granger as its leader, but it is believed that a significant number remained with the AFC. At the 2011 elections the APNU obtained 40.81 percent of the votes, much in line with its record in free and fair elections, and the AFC got 10.32. The AFC benefited from the loss of between 5 to 7 percent of its votes from previous elections. It obtained 48.60 percent.
By Article IV(1) of the Geneva Agreement of 1966, the Governments of Guyana and Venezuela committed to choosing one of the means of peaceful settlement provided for by article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), if the Mixed Commission did not arrive at a full agreement for the settlement of the controversy within four years. Judicial settlement was one of those means under article 33. But the part of the article providing for the parties to choose the means of settlement is qualified by Article V. It provides that they are to refer the decision of the means of settlement to an “appropriate international organ on which they both agree,” but failing agreement “to the Secretary General of the United Nations.”
After the conclusion of the mandate of the Mixed Commission, the Governments of Guyana, Venezuela and the United Kingdom entered into an agreement known as the Port of Spain Protocol in June, 1970, which suspended the operation of Article IV of the Geneva Agreement for twelve years. This meant effectively that the formal search under Article IV for a resolution of the controversy was suspended for the period. Guyana and Venezuela undertook to “explore all possibilities of better understanding between them.”
Since the victory of the APNU+AFC coalition in 2015, the colour of APNU, green, in which the President is often dressed, is being promoted everywhere. It first started with school buses and school boats. Now it is reported that school benches at some locations are being painted green. These were followed by the new, imposing, fence at the Office of the President which itself, along with State House, have now fallen victim to the colour green.
The designation of Guyana as ‘The Green State’ was not an accident. Dozens of characterizations could have been formulated to define Guyana’s intended adherence to a strict environmental regime, details of which are yet to be announced. But it is believed that the selection of the term ‘The Green State’ had something to do with the party colour and the President’s obvious attraction to it.
There was a signing bonus. It was known but denied by several Ministers of the Government. There should be consequences but the precedent has long been established that ministerial responsibilities are not recognized and therefore consequences do not flow from their actions or omissions. Unless there is a mass upsurge, which is unlikely, this uniquely unjustifiable deed will continue to be defended, as it was in or just out of the National Assembly. There is no excuse for the secrecy and any attempt to defend it is an insult to the Guyanese people. Transparency International called it “deception.”
In Guyana, politics is a zero-sum game. Rules of transparency and accountability are weak and where they exist are not enforced. No conventions have not been established or are entrenched. The prevailing wisdom, therefore, is to give the Opposition and the Guyanese people as little as possible, and where possible, nothing. This is the national, political culture derived from its core defect, the politics of ethno-political domination, which implies that the other side are their supporters are enemies and not to be trusted – with anything. It’s us and them, sometimes, us or them. And the people are the pawns. This is the reason why the APNU-AFC coalition, when in opposition, could have been so strident in defence of transparency and accountability, and can now so blithely dismiss such concepts with contempt.