The power of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) to refer the Guyana-Venezuela Border Controversy to the International Court of Justice (ICJ, also known as the World Court) and the jurisdiction of the ICJ to entertain and determine the matter, both provided for by the Geneva Agreement, have been shockingly distorted by Analyst in a February 6 article in Kaieteur News entitled “Recourse to the ICJ is on the basis of a consent regime.’ He argues that the ICJ needs Venezuela’s consent before it can exercise jurisdiction.
On November 7 the same analyst, under the moniker of Peeping Tom, said in Kaieteur News that Guyana has “bungled its handling of the territorial controversy” and “will not achieve its objective of having the matter placed before the ICJ.” This prediction ignominiously failed when the UNSG on January 30 chose the ICJ as a means of settlement. No doubt this failure prompted a change of identification from Peeping Tom to Analyst for his February 6 article so as to disguise his authorship of the November 7 failed prediction. His opinions in the February 6 article are as shallow as the prediction made in his November 7 article.
By Article IV(1) of the Geneva Agreement of 1966, the Governments of Guyana and Venezuela committed to choosing one of the means of peaceful settlement provided for by article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), if the Mixed Commission did not arrive at a full agreement for the settlement of the controversy within four years. Judicial settlement was one of those means under article 33. But the part of the article providing for the parties to choose the means of settlement is qualified by Article V. It provides that they are to refer the decision of the means of settlement to an “appropriate international organ on which they both agree,” but failing agreement “to the Secretary General of the United Nations.”
After the conclusion of the mandate of the Mixed Commission, the Governments of Guyana, Venezuela and the United Kingdom entered into an agreement known as the Port of Spain Protocol in June, 1970, which suspended the operation of Article IV of the Geneva Agreement for twelve years. This meant effectively that the formal search under Article IV for a resolution of the controversy was suspended for the period. Guyana and Venezuela undertook to “explore all possibilities of better understanding between them.”
Wracked by dissention and uncertainty, compounded by the dismissal of Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, known by the nickname of Crocodile which he embraces, the army on Wednesday occupied strategic points in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, and deposed President Robert Mugabe, aged 93 and in power for 37 years. The army, led by General Constantino Chiwenga, said that it was not a coup. It appears as if efforts are being made to attain a peaceful and lawful transition of power from Mugabe to a government led by Mnangagwa.
The unfolding events, as they became known, show that Mnangagwa was true to his nickname. In collusion with the army, he was patiently awaiting an opportune moment to move against Mugabe who appeared determined to promote his wife, Grace Mugabe, a deeply unpopular ZANU-PF official, who represents the post-liberation ZANU-PF group, G40, to succeed him. This would have resulted in the sidelining of the army and the veterans. There was open, verbal, warfare, between these two distinct sections of the Zimbabwean ruling class. The people of Zimbabwe, downtrodden by poverty, have been unmoved by what is clearly a palace dispute.