It could be true, as some observers have claimed, that Iran decided to enrich uranium from 3.67 percent to its current 60 percent, which is in compliance with IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) protocols, not for the purpose of building a nuclear bomb, but to have a stronger hand in any future negotiations after President Trump, during his first term, withdrew from the JCPOA, (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and authorized the assassination of Quasem Solemani, an Iranian major general and head of Iran’s Quds Force. The JCPOA, signed in 2015 under the Presidency of Barack Obama, was an agreement between Iran, US and several other countries that placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme by: (a) intrusive inspections by the IAEA; and (b) limiting the enrichment of uranium to a maximum of 3.67 percent.
If this was the strategy, Iran could not conceivably have revealed its intention as it would have lost the advantage it would gain. Also, it would have made no sense for Iran to restrict inspections from the IAEA because, for the plan to succeed, the world had to know that it was enriching uranium. Israel, the United States and the entire Western world, had the intelligence and analytical capabilities to understand Iran’s motives. Maybe they did. Yet they promoted the single narrative that Iran was within weeks of acquiring a nuclear bomb, as a justification to start a war, in the midst of negotiations which were not concluded. The objective was to destroy Iran nuclear facilities and promote regime change to force Iran’s surrender.
Diplomatic engagements between Iran and the US were initiated by the US a few months ago. After the bombing campaign,4 Iran characterized the diplomacy as a cover for the bombing because negotiations were ongoing. There is no certainty, and much dispute, as to the extent to which Iran’s nuclear facilities and material have been damaged. Whatever the extent, the dominant view is that the nuclear programme can be reconstituted in time. The other objective, hardly disguised, was to effect regime change. This was unsuccessful, as expected, by a bombing campaign only. Iran announced the termination of diplomatic negotiations and has suspended inspections by the IAEA, which it has accused of leaking the identities of nuclear scientists to facilitate their assassinations by Israel. This was denied by the IAEA.
Iran would have long recognized the possibility of a bombing campaign after decades of threats from Israel and hostility from the US. It was at the instigation of the West that Iraq launched its invasion of Iran in 2003 and, after Iran finally succeeded in expelling Iraq in 2011, it had lost almost a million of its people. Going further back, it took twenty-five years and the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to overcome the imposition of Shah Reza Pahlavi after the elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh was overthrown in 1953. This is one of the enduring reasons for Iran’s hostility to the West. The recent bombing may well suggest to Iran that its compromises in the past, such as cooperating in the War Against Terror, the signing of the JCPOA and the return to diplomatic negotiations, have been insufficient to earn it respite from Western hostility.
In looking to the future, Iran has to consider the inadequacies of its military, the sanctions which it has had to face, internal unrest, the unpopularity of its government and the recent successes of the Israeli-US bombing campaign, although Iran’s bombing of Israeli cities in response are not to be dismissed. Iran will also have to consider the experiences of other countries such as Libya, which gave up its nuclear programme only to have its government removed and its President, Muammar Gaddafi, horribly assassinated. The case of North Korea would also be instructive. Its capacity to destroy Seoul, the capital of South Korea, in a swift retaliatory strike, protected it from Western intervention to prevent the building nuclear weapons. The consequence is that while the North Korean regime is protected by its possession of nuclear weapons, it has been made into a pariah country that constantly faces famine.
Iran’s objective is the removal of sanctions, the building of its economy and military in the face of continuing western hostility, and the acceptance of its role as a regional power with an interest in regional stability as a protective cover for itself from Israeli and US threats. It may well conclude that the best way to achieve these objectives, is to continue on the same course with some modifications, having regard to the loss or weakening of its state (Syria) and non-state (Hamas, Hezbollah) allies, and bearing in mind that unless the West introduces ground troops, its regime is fairly safe from being militarily removed. It can therefore keep the West guessing as to its intentions and enter negotiations at later time, if it can find any wiggle room to do so. Going out on a limb, it can produce a nuclear device in secret, hoping for no military blowback for Israel and the West, and then announce it to the world. No one would dare to attack thereafter.