GUYANA’S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES RELATING TO VENEZUELA

Few in Guyana have any sympathy with Nicholas Maduro and the Venezuelan regime which rigged the last elections to remain in power. Notwithstanding Caricom’s advocacy of the Caribbean as a zone of peace, meaning that American warships and troops, threatening the Maduro regime, should leave the area, opinions are sharply divided. The Trinidad and Tobago Government,reacted presumably to the flow of drugs and illegal guns that have fueled an extensive increase in crime over the past decade.Trinidad has strongly supported the US policies regarding Venezuela and has engaged in vocal criticisms of Caricom and individual Caricom countries. No doubt Trinidad may be reacting also to the six Caricom countries’ which are membership of ALBA, a Venezuelan front organization that supplies cheap oil. 

Guyana’s policies have been more nuanced. Removing “isms” from the PPP’s constitution, it accelerated its slow drift to the strengthening of relations with the United States. The elections of 2020 gave impetus to that policy and Venezuela’s increasing hostility and arms build-up resulted in Guyana created the basis for vocal US support for Guyana against Venezuela threats. Faced with the deployment of US warships in the Region and the threat to overthrow the Venezuelan regime, Guyana has been seeking a passage through the Strait of Medina guarded by Scylla on one side and Charybdis on the other. Burnham had a more relatable explanation of this dilemma. It was of a person trying to ride two donkeys at the same time and speculation on the part of the anatomy the hapless rider would land on as he/she fell off the bucking donkeys. Guyana has tried to satisfy the requirements of Caricom solidarity and at the same time give a nod to the American action by expressing opposition to the export of drugs. Notwithstanding the challenges such policies harbour, Guyana has done the best it could under the circumstances and most would find sympathy with this posture. 

Lost to the world, but certainly not to Guyanese, is the existential threat posed to Guyana by Venezuela. The incorporation of Essequibo in Venezuela’s constitution as part of Venezuela, the purported holding of elections for a Governor and congressional representatives, the militarization of Ankoko, the military build-up along border areas, the provocative criminal activities being supported and /or tolerated by the Venezuelan regime, both along the border and inside Guyana, the invasion of the area of our exclusive economic zone where oil production is being carried out, all together pose an existential threat to Guyana. For these reasons, most Guyanese would be happy to see the back of the Venezuelan regime. But this comes with challenging dilemmas. The Venezuela Opposition won the elections, nominally led by Edmundo Gonzales, but whose most popular and best-known leader is Nobel Prize laureate, Maria Corina Machado. Despite Ms. Machado’s past association with the Venezuelan right wing and militancy in relation to Essequibo, she opposed Madour’s nationalism relating to the controversy which she saw as a nationalistic tool. She has not joined calls for the invasion of Essequibo and has advocated that Venezuela should formally recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the Border Controversy.

Guyana cannot allow the dispute between the US and Venezuela to go to waste. As the confrontation grows sharper, and as the determination of the US to secure the removal of Maduro grows more determined, it is looking increasingly evident that the life of the Maduro regime has already been seriously undermined and that it may not survive. Guyana’s support for the US can and should be levered to secure a promise from the Venezuelan opposition that it will accept and/or respect the decision of the ICJ. Recognising the jurisdiction of the ICJ is a first step. Accepting the decision is the second.

If the Maduro regime falls, and the opposition takes office, having won the elections, the new Venezuela Government and the United States will become close friends. The US interest in Venezuelan politics will decline and its interest in Venezuela oil will skyrocket. The US interest and leverage over Venezuela’s policy in relation to Guyana, once the threat of the invasion of Essequibo or interference to ExxonMobil’s interest in the Atlantic are removed, would not be as effective as it can now be. Guyana should therefore get to work today on the multiple fronts that are available to persuade the Venezuelan opposition to commit to recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ and acceptingits decision. The most important front is the United States. 

The Guyana Government can now formally communicate with opposition members of the Venezuelan Congress. While this might pose difficulty for the Venezuelans who will face Maduro’s rage and Venezuelan prisons, it can be facilitated by the US. But there is a large body of Venezuelans of the middle and ruling classes who have been displaced by the Chavez/Maduro regime who have never seen any future in Venezuela’s claim, even if they might have felt aggrieved at the 1899 Arbitral Award. I met many of those people when I was involved in the Guyana Venezuela Border Controversy through the UN Good Office Process from 1994 to 2011. They still exist and, if contacted informally, can influence the Venezuelan opposition.