IMPERIALISM IS ALIVE AND WELL
The use of the word ‘imperialism’ went out of fashion after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of a unipolar world with the US as the leading hegemon. Earlier this week, the New York Times and its opinion writers have begun to describe as ‘imperialism’ the US government’s announced policy that it will ‘run’ Venezuela and ‘take control’ of its oil with some of the proceeds going to Venezuela. But after payment of the US$12 billion allegedly owed to ConocoPhillips and the US$20 billion owed to ExxonMobil, the deduction of the investment advances necessary to restart the oil industry, estimated at in excess of US$100 billion over ten years, and the payment of oil profits to the oil companies, Venezuela will be lucky to get some scraps. In Guyana, 75 percent ‘Cost Oil’ goes to ExxonMobil to pay down on past and present expenditures and of the remaining 25 percent ‘Profit oil,’ Guyana gets half. The other half goes to ExxonMobil. Venezuela will be lucky to be treated as generously as Guyana.
The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, not its original progressive objective of preventing the colonization of Latin America by European powers, but its later purpose of prohibiting progressive development, attracted much criticism. Its recent revision by the Trump Corollary has now expanded the Monroe Doctrine’s modern prohibitions against forward-looking economic and political developments in the region. It asserts US preeminence in the Western hemisphere and defines its right to access energy and mineral resources as a condition of its security and prosperity.
Cheddi Jagan spent his entire career analysing the manner in which multi-national corporations exploit Latin America, extract and repatriate far more profits than their investments and intervene directly and indirectly when even mildly progressive measures are attempted. He gave as examples the coup against Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, who attempted modest agrarian reforms. Almost twenty years later, in 1973, the same thing occurred to Salvador Allende of Chile, this time costing him his life and the death, torture and imprisonment of thousands. There were many others who fell foul of the US because of their mildly progressive ideas. Jagan’s own attempts at modest reforms resulted in his removal on two separate occasions – in 1953 and 1964 with orchestrated violence. The US intervention in Venezuela is merely the most recent in a long list in Latin America.
Events in Venezuela are still unfolding. Despite the recent election results which showed that a majority of the electorate favoured the opposition, Chavism has taken deep roots and the Chavistas, civilians and military alike, are armed. As Lydia Polgreen said in the NY Times (9 Jan), “it is not hard to spot a quagmire on the horizon. The country, with its armed paramilitaries loyal to Chavismo and security elite chafing at vassalage, could quickly become a sinkhole for American blood and treasure.”
The current Venezuelan government, although talking tough to maintain its credentials internally, is cooperating with the US. It appears that to save itself, at least for the time being, it would have to agree for the US and US companies to take over its oil industry. Whether the Venezuelan government can maintain internal peace while at the same time genuflecting to the US, remains to be seen. It appears that the US understands that the Venezuelan government is the only armed stabilizing force at the present time capable of maintaining order while the oil deals are being negotiated.
It is clear that the US cannot take control of Venezuela’s oil industry in less than several years and unless it has full control of government policy. It is difficult to conceive how this would be possible without boots on the ground. If this becomes necessary, it will add a whole new dimension to the US intervention and raise serious questions. Would the US support the long-term occupation of office by the Venezuelan government, several of whose members are under indictment? If not, would the government resign voluntarily after the US ceases to support it or if it has run its course? If so, will the armed Chavistas allow a new government comprising the conservative opposition to take office? And will the army, loyal to Chavism, transfer its loyalty to new leaders, who have a history of opposition to Chavism? How would the US ‘run’ Venezuela if these or similar conditions emerge? A potential solution is a deal with the current military and civilian leadership for its support and/or retirement in return for amnesty.
Guyana’s main concern will undoubtedly be the impact of events on the Guyana Venezuela Border Controversy which is currently before the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and likely to be heard later this year. There is no reason to believe that Venezuela’s approach to the case, that is to say, non-recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ but participation in the proceedings so far, is likely to change. But if the US’s engagement with Venezuela remains and intensifies, its opposition to Venezuela’s claim that the Arbitral Award of 1899 is null and void, and support for Guyana’s position, could potentially, and hopefully, influence Venezuela’s posture. But Guyana should not hold its breadth!
