In a recent advertisement, shown above, the National Independent Party (“NIP”), led by Mr. Saphier Husain-Subedar, until recently known as Mr. Saphier Husain, announced its intention to contest the upcoming elections. Mr. Husain-Subedar, a lawyer, was recently admitted to practice in Canada, which was the subject of a congratulatory advertisement in the press
If the PPP/C is returned with only a plurality of the votes at the upcoming elections as in 2011, it could adopt the sensible course of inviting the opposition to join it in a coalition government. The PPP would be mindful of recent, salutary, experience in Sweden. The centre-left, minority, government of two months was forced to resign in early December because it did not get the support of the far right, Sweden Democrats, who wanted immigration to be further restricted. Also, a further gridlock is unlikely to be sustainable for more than a year this time around.
The PPP would, of course, like any other party obtaining a plurality, like to be in the majority in a coalition and may invite only one of the opposition parties to join a coalition. The obvious consideration in opposition strategy, if an invitation is forthcoming, is to ensure that it will have the same majority as it would have had in opposition. To avoid being in a minority, the opposition party may well insist that the other opposition party, its colleague over the past three years, be also invited to join which would give the opposition a majority in the coalition. A breakdown in the negotiations at this early stage may well lead to the Swedish Option.
The electorate will be called upon in 2015 to decide the political shape of Guyana for the immediate future. The performance of the economy and resolution of social problems will be dominant considerations. The electorate will punish the party in office if it feels that its economic and social conditions have not improved. It did so when the PNC was in office. It did so in 2011. There will a significant enough shift in sentiment to affect the outcome of the elections if the electorate is sufficiently dissatisfied.
If it is, it is unlikely to accept the excuse that the Opposition did not support projects. The electorate’s response to any such allegation may well be that it sent a message at the last elections that there should be a coalition government, which the PPP had the power to implement, but which it ignored and, therefore, it has no one to blame but itself for an allegedly recalcitrant Opposition.
A constitution defines the basic laws, structures for governance and rights and responsibilities under which a society is organized. A constitution needs to be changed when some or all of its rules no longer reflect the popular will or when they have been overtaken after the effluxion of time. Suggestions for reform of the constitution, therefore, reflect a view that it is in need of restructuring.
The recent proposals of the AFC announced by its Chair, Mr. Nigel Hughes, at the party’s recent conference suggests that the structure of our executive and legislature, and the relationship between them, need to be altered. These proposals add to those already in circulation, offered by other persons. There is also substantial writing and academic material on record on situations like Guyana’s. This debate will gather steam and climb to the top of the agenda only when the political conditions mature.
Continue reading “CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM NEEDS POLITICAL CONSENSUS”
For some who oppose the PPP, an alliance of opposition political parties to contest elections has always been a prime objective. The AFC brought that reality closer at its conference last weekend when Party Leader, Khemraj Ramjattan, in a departure from previous policy, offered the AFC as the leader of a pro-democracy opposition alliance of trade unions, civil society, disaffected PPP members and APNU to contest the upcoming general elections. APNU’s leaders welcomed the initiative but appeared to be less than enthusiastic.
History and political realities suggest that opposition unity would be difficult to achieve. The pre-1992 efforts between the constituent parties of the PCD (Patriotic Coalition for Democracy), the WPA being one, did not succeed. There have never been any substantial alliances that have made a political difference and have endured. The first major, informal alliance between classes and individuals in Guyana’s politics was in 1950 under the banner of the PPP. But this was not a structural alliance between different, organized, groups. It failed anyway.
